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I woke up this morning. I am going to class today. I am going to watch a movie. It
seems natural to relate to the world in the context of ‘me’ and ‘I’. For most people reality is
grounded in a strong sense of self, and it is hard to conceive that there is any alternative to
perceiving the world except through I. As Rene Descartes famously stated, “I think therefore, I
am,” whereby I is defined as the basis of existence for most of us. According to Descartes, it is
1

through my mere ability to think that surely, I exist. In fact, we find comfort in knowing that
there is an I because it validates our experience. This sense of I is not limited to the realm of
daily experience, but extends to religious experiences as well.
Prevalent within many religious traditions is the relationship of I with the divine. I am
going to pray to God today. I should go to go to church on Sunday. I hope that my sins will be
forgiven. Many religious practices are oriented towards promoting, improving, or repairing an
individual’s relationship with the divine, and in this way are rooted in this fundamental dualism.
The classic Christian hymn, “Jesus Loves Me” by Anna Bartlett Warner demonstrates an I-me
dichotomy when she writes “Jesus loves me this I know for the bible tells me so” [italics mine].

2

Across theistic traditions, the sense of self in relation to the divine is emphasized; however,
Buddhism challenges the notion of ‘I’ through its teaching of anātman or non-self. Non-self is a
distinctly Buddhist teaching that defies the sense of duality defining most Western religious
thought. Duality in the most basic sense is the distinction between subject and object. Typically,
the subject is I and the object is something separate from I. In the case of “I am going to watch a
movie”, I is the subject and the movie is the object. This view asserts that the movie exists
separately from I, and I exists separately from the movie. In contrast to this view, Buddhism

1. René Descartes, A Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch (London: J.M. Dent &
Sons Limited, 1953).
2. Anna Bartlett Warner, Jesus Loves Me, 1860.
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states that the appearance of duality is fundamentally mistaken. From the perspective of Buddhist
non-dualism, there is no distinction between I and the movie; both are simply mind and the
duality of self and other is the projection of ignorance. Through the realization of non-self,
Buddhists claim to understand that there is no real distinction between internal and external
phenomena, as we believe there is based on ordinary appearance; according to later schools of
Buddhist thought, all phenomenon are inherently “empty” of self-other duality.
My interest in this topic was inspired when my own understanding of self was challenged
while meditating in a contemplative practice course. During an in-class guided meditation, we
were instructed to look at the origin of our thoughts, our mind, and to locate precisely where that
might be. Through my own practice, I could no longer locate the origin of my sense of self, and
in that moment, it ceased to appear to exist all together. After the small glimpse I had in my own
meditation practice of non-self, I struggled to find the words to describe my experience. The loss
of my sense of self was initially terrifying for I feel such a sense of security in knowing there is
an I. Every experience I have had in my life, everything that I do on a day-to-day basis revolves
around me knowing that there is an I. I am attached to a sense of I, and in the brief moment when
I could no longer locate it, I questioned just about everything that I have believed to be true in
my life. This transformative experience was isolated from any detailed explanation of the
Buddhist teaching of non-self in the course; rather, the meditation instruction was to simply
explore the source and nature of thoughts. It was not until I took a Buddhism course that I was
better able to contextualize that experience from what I learned about the tradition, but even
then, words still failed to encapsulate the realness of my experience. Through learning about
non-self in Buddhism, I was equipped with a discourse about the concept and was better able to
put into words what had previously been wordless or ineffable. For this reason, the Buddhist

4
concept of non-self provides a unique opportunity to discuss ineffability in religious experience.
Given that the study of religion relies on discourse as a basis, the inherent ineffability of
religious experience poses a challenge to it, yet it is simultaneously a defining characteristic of
religion. For scholars of religion, discourse and other conceptual components can be discussed,
but when critically and comparatively exploring what defines ultimate reality, such as ātman in
Hinduism and anātman in Buddhism, experience is at the foundation and cannot be dismissed.
The concept of non-self as taught by the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama (ca. 563483 BCE), is said to be preserved in the Anattalakkhana Sutta, and practitioners continue to
emphasize its highly experiential nature. Ajahn Chah (1918-1992), a Thai monk, said that “To
understand not-self, you have to meditate. If you only intellectualize, your head will explode.
Once you understand not-self in your heart, the burden of life will be lifted.” Here Chah argues
3

not only that words fail to encapsulate the experience of non-self, but also the importance of nonself in removing “the burden of life” or suffering. This ineffability of non-self or ultimate truth in
Buddhism is not limited to that tradition, but rather can be seen in accounts of religious
experience across a diversity of traditions. Prevalent in Chah’s statement is the inherent tension
between looking at things conceptually and the need to experience them directly. A broader
conversation about ineffability in religious experience will illuminate the difficulty in
conceptualizing ultimate reality, which Buddhism defines as non-self.
Many scholars across different disciplines have explored the relationship between
language, ineffability, and religious experience. Among them is communication scholar Kenneth
Burke, who revolutionized the field of communication by broadening views of rhetoric as

3. Achaan Chah, A Still Forest Pool: The Insight Meditation of Achaan Chah, ed. Jack
Kornfield and Paul Breiter, (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1985), 173.

5
persuasion alone. He argues that rhetoric is “the use of language as a symbolic means of
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” Under a traditional
4

definition of rhetoric as persuasion, rhetoric would be something used by religion whereas
5

Burke’s definition aims to suggest that religion is itself rhetorical. While Burke is not a scholar
of religion, nor is he in conversation with other scholars of religion, which is problematic in
some respects, his exploration of language in religion through texts such as St. Augustine’s
Confessions provides unique insights into ineffability. In fact, he notes the distinction between
his own work being the study of logology, or “words about words,” in contrast to theology
meaning “words about God.” In the forward to his book, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in
6

Logology, he asserts that religion is rhetorical and therefore is included well within his own area
of study as a rhetorician:
The subject of religion falls under the head of rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric is the art
of persuasion, and religion cosmogonies are designed, in the last analysis, as
exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion.
7

While Burke expands the field of rhetoric through his scholarship, he still relies on Plato’s
fundamental definition of rhetoric as the art of persuasion. Proceeding with this notion that
8

religion falls under the study of rhetoric, Burke identifies four “realms” to which words refer:
words for the natural; words for the socio-political realm; words about words; and words for the

4. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1950), 43.
5. These traditional definitions of rhetoric as persuasion refers to the work of Aristotle,
Plato, and Cicero.
6. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1961), 1.
7. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1961), foreward.
8. Plato, Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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supernatural. Divided respectively into the first three realms, the words “tree”, “justice”, and
9

“rhetoric” are often assumed to merely be words, but Burke aims to distinguish the function of
each of these words in linguistic usage. Words for the natural are those that describe that which
can be seen in the world regardless of whether or not there is a word assigned to it. Words for
the socio-political realm are those created that have meaning within society particularly with
regard to law and politics. Words about words are those having to do with the technical aspects
of words, particularly pertaining to language, etymology, and rhetoric. The first three realms of
words constitute everyday experience, the mundane; however, the fourth realm, words for the
supernatural, pertain to a distinct realm and are of particular relevance to this discussion of
ineffability. Burke continues:
The supernatural is by definition the realm of the “ineffable.” And language by definition
is not suited to the expression of the “ineffable.” So our words for the fourth realm, the
supernatural or “ineffable”, are necessarily borrowed from our words for the sorts of
things we can talk about literally, our words for the three empirical orders [realms] (the
world of everyday experience).
10

Burke states that words for the ineffable are not unique to religious experience, but rather they
are borrowed from the realm of words that we already know. A common frustration of those
trying to recall their religious experience is the many ways in which ordinary words fail to
describe that experience, and an experience of non-self is no exception.
An attempt to find a word more suitable for the fourth realm as described by Burke can
be seen in the work of Rudolf Otto. In his book, The Idea of the Holy, Otto identifies the word
“holy” as particular to the field of religion:

9. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1961), 14.
10. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1961), 15.
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“Holiness”—“the holy”—is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the
sphere of religion. It is, indeed, applied by transference to another sphere—that of
Ethics—but it is not itself derived from this. While it is complex, it contains a quite
specific element or “moment” which sets it apart from “the Rational” in the meaning we
gave to that word above, and which remains inexpressible—or ineffabile—in the sense
that it completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts.
11

As Otto demonstrates, words like “holy” accrue meaning in the realm of religion and ethics, but
at their core are attempts to describe the ineffable. In terms of Burke’s four realms, the word
“holy” would be borrowed from the first three realms of words and attributed to the realm of the
supernatural. In an attempt to solve this shortcoming, Otto calls for the creation of a new word
better suited for the realm of the supernatural that is not borrowed from another realm of words:
By means of a special term we shall the better be able, first, to keep the meaning clearly
apart and distinct, and second, to apprehend and classify connectedly whatever
subordinate forms or stages of development it may show.
12

In Otto’s call for a creation of a new term, he recognizes how the meanings of words can become
ambiguous when they are not distinct from other uses of the word. For example, the use of the
word “holy” in phrases such as “The Holy Bible” or “Holy Father” associates the term with the
Abrahamic traditions. The special term that Otto suggests is the word numinous, to describe the
holy devoid of a moral factor that is universal. By not limiting the conversation of “holy” to the
13

Abrahamic traditions, Otto believes that numinous is more universal. Otto also speaks of a

11. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, Translated by John W. Harvey, (Mansfield
Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2010), 5.
12. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, Translated by John W. Harvey, (Mansfield
Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2010), 7.
13. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, Translated by John W. Harvey, (Mansfield
Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2010), 7.
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“numinous state of mind,” and in this way he frees the word from being limited to any one
14

religion for states of mind are not exclusive to any one tradition. While Otto’s work makes a
valiant effort to combat the failure of words to describe experience, even he recognizes the truly
ineffable nature of religious experience.
Another critic lamenting the failure of language who also explores the concept of duality
is Martin Buber (1878-1965). According to Buber, duality is inescapable in man’s language:
“the attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak.” He
15

identifies two types of word pairs, “I-It” and “I-You”. The “I-It” according to Buber is the world
as experience, duality in the most basic sense: “I” being the subject and “It” being the object. On
the other hand, the “I-You” word pair establishes the world of relation. On the nature of “You”
16

Buber writes:
Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into
thinghood again and again. In the language of objects: every thing in the world can—
either before or after is [sic] becomes a thing—appear to some I as its You. But the
language of objects catches only one corner of actual life.
17

The lesson from Buber, that everything will appear in the world in some form of I or you, will
prove especially relevant in understanding how the Buddha teaches non-self through the five
aggregates. While Buber asserts that “you” is a thing, Buddhism suggest that “you” is not
actually the thing it appears to be. As will be discussed below, it is not that self does not appear
as I in the world, but rather, it does not exist as it appears. If language can only capture one
corner of actual life, then there must be aspects of life that transcend language. These aspects of

14. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, Translated by John W. Harvey, (Mansfield
Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2010), 7.
15. Martin Buber, I and Thou, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 53.
16. Martin Buber, I and Thou, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 53
17. Martin Buber, I and Thou, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 69.
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life that transcend language are generally accounted for differently according to each religion. In
this way, Buber’s understanding that the language of objects only catches a corner of actual life
makes a strong case for the experiential nature of concepts in religion: since language cannot
capture the thing described, it must be experienced.
William James (1842-1910), a philosopher and psychologist also demonstrates the
limiting nature of words in relation to the ineffable. In his twenty-lecture series, published as The
Varieties of Religious Experience, James explores the notion of the ineffable as a defining
characteristic of religious experience. While his lectures precede the work of Burke by sixty
years, James demonstrates precisely what Burke identifies in the fourth realm of words—the
limiting nature of words to describe religious experience. In his sixteenth lecture entitled
“Mysticism”, he identifies four characteristics of religious experiences: ineffability, noetic
quality, transiency, and passivity. The first characteristic, ineffability, means that by nature
religious experiences do not lend themselves to being conveyed through words. Secondly, the
noetic quality of religious experiences offers a sense of insight or new state of knowledge to the
person who is experiencing it. James’ third quality, transiency, states that religious experiences
are bound by time, according to him they last “at most an hour or two.” The final characteristic
18

of religious experience is the passivity of the participant to the content of the experience; the
practitioner feels as though they are not in control of their own experience. The last three
characteristics of religious experience identified by James’ help to explain why religious
experiences are unique and why they are often deemed ineffable by those who experience them.
In his description of ineffability, he writes:

18. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature,
1902, 372.
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The subject of [the religious experience] immediately says that it defies expression, that
no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its
quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others.
19

This notion that religious experience cannot be imparted or transferred to others complicates the
concept of religion within the study of religion. Religion generally derives from at least one
person sharing a transcendent experience, however that may be defined. While the individual,
their experience, and their method all vary, at the heart of any religion is experience in some
form or another. In the Abrahamic traditions, God shares his message through a human
messenger. In Buddhism, Siddhartha Gautama had his own enlightenment experience and,
through his teachings, aims to instruct others towards achieving the same liberation. Even
though religious experience is generally defined as ineffable, by necessity each religion develops
some form of discourse about it. Here, James suggests that to overcome the closed, singular
experience of ineffability, one must experience the ineffable for themselves.
Each of the above scholars, among others, have acknowledged the complex nature of
words, particularly in discussions of ineffable experience, but this topic is not limited to the
philosophers of history. In his book Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and
Religion, contemporary scholar Ben-Ami Scharfstein takes a particular interest in ineffability
across many different traditions, Buddhism among them. Scharfstein devotes a chapter of his
book discussing “word-devaluers,” which he defines as “religious thinkers who devalue words
because, they believe, words miss the profound objects of faith.” Scharfstein’s use of the phrase
20

the “profound objects of faith” takes different meanings in dualistic and non-dualistic traditions.

19. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature,
1902, 371.
20. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion,
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 85.
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For dualistic traditions, these “objects of faith” may be considered actual objects, whereas in
non-dualistic traditions the “objects of faith” may refer to the experience itself, such as the
experience of non-self. Favoring the non-dualistic perspective, “word-devaluers” are religious
thinkers who devalue words because they believe that words miss the true nature of experience.
Among the word-devaluers that Scharfstein discusses are Taoists as well as Buddhists of India,
China, and Japan. In regard to Buddhist philosophers, Scharfstein states that they “argue that
words are inherently misleading.” According to Scharfstein, the most renowned and compelling
word-devaluer is Mahayana Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250 century CE).

21

Nāgārjuna asserts that when it comes to the analysis of emptiness, the attempt to use words to
describe it will fail:
When an analysis is made through emptiness,
If someone were to offer a reply,
That reply will fail, since it will presuppose
Exactly what is to be proven.
22

Nāgārjuna’s understanding demonstrated in this passage values the direct experience of
emptiness as the only way to understand the concept of emptiness. The concern of a worddevaluer is that the listener might take words too literally and therefore miss the meaning of what
they were trying to convey. While the complete devaluation of words may be effective in some
circumstances, it would be problematic for a religion to forego words all together. Scharfstein
writes:

21. Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5.
22. Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjunas
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1995), 13.
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In order to escape the bonds of conceptuality, the Buddhists propose a hierarchical series
of meditations by means of which one is supposed to be able to rise beyond words and
into the ineffable state of “emptiness”.
23

The challenge that ineffability poses to religion is combatted by Buddhism in its highly
experiential nature through the tradition’s emphasis on meditation. Upon his enlightenment, the
Buddha does not attempt to describe his ineffable experience in terms of the things he saw and
felt, for words would fail to capture his experience, instead he used words to his benefit,
specifically through metaphor to create a path that could be followed by others. In the final
chapter of his book, Scharfstein offers an insightful definition of the ineffable:
The term ineffable is used to protect certain cherished experiences from being explained
or, rather, explained away. So used, the term is a declaration that one judges other things
in the light of these cherished experiences, and not the opposite. The ineffable is then the
experiential criterion that one refuses to judge in terms that one feels are alien to it and
contradict its finality.
24

This understanding of the ineffable proposed by Scharfstein allows one to understand not what
ineffability fails to do (articulate the precise nature of experience) as philosophers such as James
and Otto have been concerned with, but rather he recognizes what ineffability does. In this way
his definition privileges experience, and he argues that understanding experience as ineffable
protects it from the limits of language. If words were completely devalued, then there would be
no discourse in religion and the spread of religious ideas would become virtually impossible.
Had the Buddha decided that there was no way he could attempt to use words to describe
his experience, there would have been a profound impact on the development of Buddhism as a
religion. It is one thing to acknowledge the lack of precision in words but another to discredit

23. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion,
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 86.
24. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ineffability: The Failure of Words in Philosophy and Religion,
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 185.
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them altogether; each religion offers a unique approach to the obstacle of ineffability. Therefore,
Scharfstein’s definition of ineffability that simultaneously privileges experience while not
discrediting words completely allows for a more optimistic approach to language in the
discussion of non-self. Total skepticism towards the power of words to communicate would limit
religions themselves. Through this analysis of the failure of words to describe religious
experience, one must concede that words remain the best available means to make sense of
ineffable experiences. Even Nāgārjuna had to use words in order to devalue them. As we know,
words play a critical role in creating, understanding, communicating, and defining religion.

Defining Religion in the Study of Religion
When discussing terms that find their meaning in religion, it is necessary to define
exactly what we mean by the word “religion”. It might seem that because things are defined as
religion (i.e. Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.) that there is a distinct
definition, yet because so many things are considered “religious” and many vary greatly from
one another, it makes the task of defining religion quite complex. Even locating religion as a
field of study is complicated because for the majority of human history, religion was not
considered something separate from other aspects of culture. As a result of thinkers such as
German philosopher Immanuel Kant, religion came to be identified as something distinct after
the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment. Among those who have attempted to define the
25

term are psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and philosophers. Each attempt
to define religion, regardless of its success, reveals insight into how people think about religion.

25. Jeffrey Brodd, Layne Little, Bradley P. Nystrom, Robert Platzner, Richard Hon-chun.
Shek, and Erin E. Stiles, Invitation to World Religions, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 4.
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While there has been a plethora of definitions of religion over history to choose from, those
below have been selected specifically to illuminate their shortcomings in relation to the
discussion of non-self in Buddhism.
Particularly problematic for a discussion of non-self would be adopting too narrow a
definition of religion. For example, take William James’ definition of religion as “the feelings,
acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” According to James’ rather narrow
26

definition of religion, his emphasis on an individual’s relationship to the divine cannot account
for the Buddhist teaching of non-self and thereby limits the possibility of its analysis. His
definition is dualistic by emphasizing the self in relation to the divine and therefore excludes
traditions that are not theistic, never mind not based in dualism, such as Buddhism. James’
definition is also particularly problematic for non-self because non-self asserts that there is no
truly existent individual that stands in relation to the divine, which also does not truly exist
according to Buddhism. While his definition attempts to be inclusive by stating “whatever [the
individual] may consider the divine” instead of naming a specific divinity such as God or Allah,
the definition still excludes non-dual traditions, thus a more inclusive and yet more precise
definition of religion is necessary.
A better example may be that of Bruce Lincoln, a professor of divinity at the University
of Chicago. While the main objective of Lincoln’s book Holy Terrors is to discuss the ways in
which religion is thought about post-9/11, he identifies the need for a proper definition of

26. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience; a Study in Human Nature,
(New York, NY: Longmans, Green, 1922), 31-32.
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religion itself. According to Lincoln, the dominant definition that preceded his own is that of
Clifford Geertz, which is presented in Religion as a Cultural System:
(1) A system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.
27

In the development of Lincoln’s definition, he is responding to Talal Asad’s critiques of Geertz’s
definition of religion. The first of Asad’s main critiques that Lincoln examines is that Geertz’s
definition is too focused on the interiority of religion through his use of words such as
“symbols”, “moods”, “motivations” and “conceptions”. Asad’s second critique of Geertz is
28

similar to Otto’s critique of the word “holy,” there can be no universal definition of religion
because the term cannot be separated from the “history of discursive processes.” While Lincoln
29

aims to combat Geertz’s first shortcoming, he recognizes that all language is the historical
product of discursive processes, but this “hardly renders futile all efforts at definition, however,
particularly when one understands these as provisional attempts to clarify one’s thought, not to
capture the innate essence of things.” Lincoln’s understanding of the process of defining
30

religion is a similar approach to that of the Platonic dialogues where in the process of defining
something, the true essence of the term might be revealed. Lincoln’s definition must be
understood in the same way that he understands Geertz’s: as an effort to clarify his own thoughts
about religion rather than asserting exactly what religion is. It is through this analysis that

27. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Anthropological Approaches to
the Study of Religion (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 4.
28. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 , 2006
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1.
29. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 , 2006
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 2.
30. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 , 2006
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 2.
th

th

th
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Lincoln proposes his own definition consisting of four domains, each of which must be present
to constitute religion.
(1) A discourse whose concerns transcend the human, temporal and contingent, and that
claims for itself a similarly transcendent status.
(2) A set of practices whose goal is to produce a proper world and/or proper human
subjects, as defined by a religious discourse to which these practices are connected.
(3) A community whose members construct their identity with reference to a religious
discourse and its attendant practices.
(4) An institution that regulates discourse, practices, and community, reproducing them
over time and modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and
transcendent value.
31

This broadly inclusive definition of religion provides room for a discussion of non-self in
Buddhism while still outlining structured parameters of what constitutes a religion. When
considering ineffability as an obstacle to religion, it is interesting that the first domain Lincoln
identifies in religion is discourse, something that requires words whether they be spoken or
written. Religious discourse can be understood as the attempt to make the ineffable effable. This
identification of discourse as a domain of religion allows for the composition and study of texts,
such as suttas in Buddhism. In his discussion of the second domain, Lincoln writes:
Religious practices, which generally divide into the ritual and the ethical, render religious
discourse operational, moving it from the realm of speech and consciousness to that of
embodied material action.
32

This bridge from the realm of speech to action may be an opportunity to overcome the distance
of the ineffable through direct experience, similar to what Ajahn Chah meant when he said that
one must meditate to understand not-self. Religious practices indeed mobilize discourse, yet
Lincoln fails to state how they mobilize discourse through the nature of experience. It is one

31. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 , 2006
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5-7.
32. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 , 2006
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 6.
th

th
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thing for a religion to promote practices; it is another for those practices to be utilized and
experienced. Would Buddhism still be considered a religion if it recommended a set of practices
for meditation, but these were not utilized by Buddhists? According to Chah, one cannot
understand non-self, and thus Buddhism, without meditation.

The Buddha as the Destroyer of Houses
The origins of Buddhism date back to the historical Buddha, Prince Siddhartha Gautama
(ca. 563-483 BCE), who was born in what is now Lumbini, Nepal into the ruling, Kshatriya class
of Hinduism. According to his hagiographies, upon leaving the protection of the palace in which
33

he was raised, he sees the “four omens”: an old man, an invalid, a corpse, and a monk. After
seeing the first three demonstrating the reality of suffering, it is the omen of the monk that gives
Siddhartha hope that there might be an end to suffering. He then adopts the lifestyle of a Hindu
ascetic and leaves the palace in what is called the “great renunciation.” During this period of
intensive practice, he realizes that extreme asceticism is also a form of suffering and so cannot
accomplish his goal. He thereby realizes the Middle Way that falls to neither extreme of
asceticism nor indulgence, then makes the journey to what would become known as the Bodhi
tree to attain enlightenment. According to one of the first complete and prominent biographies of
the life of the Buddha that was composed in the 5 century CE, The Account of the Beginning
th

(The Nidanakatha) the first words spoken by the Buddha after his enlightenment were highly
metaphorical:
Seeking the builder of the house I sped along many births in Samsara but to no avail; ill is
birth again and again. O builder of the house, you are seen. Do not build the house again!

33. Edward A. Irons, Encyclopedia of Buddhism, 2008 (New York: Facts on File,
Inc.), eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost.
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All your beams are broken, and the ridgepole is shattered. The mind that has gone beyond
things composite has attained the destruction of the cravings.
34

Further analysis of this metaphor reveals some of the most fundamental teachings in Buddhism.
The builder of the house can be understood to be karma, and the house that is built is samsara.
Without a builder (karma), there is no house (samsara) and in order not to build the house, one
must destroy what supports the house: the beams and the ridgepoles. Just as a house must be
supported by beams and ridgepoles, karma is sustained by craving and ignorance. Here lies the
importance of non-self in the Buddha’s enlightenment metaphor because in Buddhism, ignorance
is believing that the self exists due to the appearance of the five aggregates. By breaking the
ridgepoles and the beams through the recognition of non-self, one can then stop the house from
being built again. This metaphor is instrumental in Buddhism, early Buddhism especially, and
provides the foundation for the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble
Eightfold Path. Following his enlightenment, he goes to Sarnath, India to deliver his first
teaching called Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in Motion (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) on the
Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path to a group of Hindu ascetics who had previously
been his companions.
Another fundamental doctrine from the Buddha’s enlightenment are the three marks of
existence: impermanence, suffering, and non-self. Each of these marks can be understood
individually; however, their meaning is not independent from one another. Conceptually, through
understanding that all things are impermanent, and that suffering is the driving force of samsara,

34. Wendy Doniger, Donald S. Lopez, Jr., and James Robson, The Norton Anthology of
World Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, ed. Jack Miles, vol. 1 (New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2014), 840.
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one will come to realize non-self, or that self does not truly exist. As Tibetan Buddhism scholar
Reginald Ray writes:
[The Buddha] taught that all ordinary existence is suffering, that this suffering results
from our own karma, and that this karma is created through the defiled nature of our own
minds. Defiled mind, he said, comes from our clinging to a notion of individual self or
ego… In this context “the path” means counteracting the clinging to a notion of ego or
self.
35

Through the Buddha’s teachings of karma and suffering, the goal of the Buddhist path is the
realization of non-self and to break down the metaphorical house. As Ray demonstrates, one
cannot just overlook non-self in the Buddhist tradition; it is fundamental in Buddhism as the
nature of ultimate reality.

No-Self, Not-Self, and Non-Self
Thus far, this paper has referred to the third mark of existence in Buddhism as non-self. It
is important to note that while this is a literal translation of anātman (Sanskrit) or anattā (Pali),
there is some variance when translating this term into English. I am not a scholar of Sanskrit or
Pali, so the objective here is not to debate the literal translation of the word, but it is important to
note that in some sources anātman or anattā takes on alternate translations such as non-ego, noself, or non-soul. Despite their seeming similarity, this difference in translation can have a
36

profound impact on how the concept is understood; no-self, not-self, and non-self all convey
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36. Non-ego, no-self, non-soul respectively:
Christmas Humphreys, A Popular Dictionary of Buddhism, 1962 (London: Arco
Publications), 32.
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LTD.), 18.
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something distinct. For example, “no-self” might mean that self does not appear at all. If the self
does not appear at all, as no-self might suggest, how would one explain our experience of it? As
will be considered below, the Buddha makes a clear distinction that the five aggregates, or what
we think of as self, does indeed appear as self to the individual—but only as a persistent and
mistaken concept. Therefore, the term no-self is problematic. “Not-self” suggests that if it is not
self, then it must be something else, and thereby implies that that something else is self. If I was
to say I know what something is not, then by means of negation, I must know what it is. This
becomes problematic philosophically, and further demonstrates the need for a careful selection
and analysis of the term. Finally, in contrast to no-self or not-self, both of which suggest the
complete negation of self, the translation of anātman as “non-self” validates the mere appearance
of self but can also imply that this self does not exist as it appears. Difficulties in the translation
of this term are even seen in the Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism’s definition of anatman: “in
Sanskrit [anātman means], “no self” or “nonself” or more broadly “insubstantiality,”” which is
37

more interpretive than literal. Each of these examples demonstrate how the meaning of the
concept changes depending on the selection of the English translation.
A closer look at the etymology of the term also reveals discrepancies in translation. The
prefix ān is itself a negation, therefore, anatman is the exact negation of ātman, the Hindu
principle of the ultimately existent “self”. Looking at the term etymologically, one can see the
direct development of Buddhism’s anātman from Hinduism’s ātman. In order to gain insight
38
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into the Buddha’s teaching of non-self, a closer look at the concept of ātman in Hindu texts and
thus its historical context is helpful.

From Hindu Self to Buddhist Non-Self
Religions typically develop in response to other traditions present at the time. Even the
most revolutionary ideas of religious thought tend to find their foundation in existing concepts.
As Paloutzian writes:
Our current events, including the formations of religions, do not emerge in a causal
vacuum. The present is affected by the past. Thus, the longer view of the “sweep of
history” in which our own lives and circumstances are embedded should be kept in view.
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The sweep of history that must be kept in view in this discussion of non-self in Buddhism is the
development of ātman in Hinduism. Prior to discussing their differing views of ātman, it is
imperative to understand the ways in which the traditions’ beliefs remain in dialogue with one
another.
Both Hinduism and Buddhism share belief in karma, the direct relationship of cause and
effect, and samsara, cyclic existence. Cyclic existence asserts that there is continuous cycle of
birth and death that is only broken through liberation. Through this shared belief in cyclic
existence, each tradition offers different understandings of what is reborn and how liberation
from cyclic existence is achieved. According to Hinduism, ātman is what is reborn, and moksha
is liberation from cyclic existence. As a henotheistic religion where there are many gods but one
is of a higher status, Hindus vary in their belief about Brahman or ultimate reality and ātman, but
among the majority of Hindus is the belief that moksha is achieved through the realization that

39. Raymond F. Paloutzian, Invitation to the Psychology of Religion, 3rd ed., 2017 (New
York, NY: Guilford Press), 30-31.
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ātman is Brahman. In this case, ātman is instrumental in achieving liberation whereas in
Buddhism, attachment to ātman binds one to cyclic existence. According to Buddhism, it is just
karma that is reborn so to speak, and nirvana is liberation from cyclic existence. This critical
difference of what is reborn in each tradition informs the development of ātman and anātman.
The task of locating ātman in Hindu texts requires a further categorization of Hindu
literature. Hindu texts can be divided into two categories, shruti and smriti. Shruti is “that
40

which is heard” and do not have a human author but are divinely revealed to sages. Shruti
includes scriptures such as the Vedas and the Upanishads. Smriti on the other hand means
“tradition” and has a human author, such as the Bhagavad Gita. In order to get a diverse view of
ātman, this section will look at ātman in both shruti and smriti, specifically in the
Brhadaranyaka Upanishad and the Bhagavad Gita.
Upanishad literally means “sitting down near [a teacher].” The Brhadaranyaka
41

Upanishad and the Chandogya Upanishad are the two earliest Upanishads and date to roughly
the seventh to sixth centuries BCE. It is in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad that the monistic
42

concept that all reality is ultimately one, ātman is Brahman, first arises. This understanding that
the self (ātman) is divine reality (Brahman) becomes instrumental in understanding Hinduism,
but also informs how later concepts arise from this early depiction of ātman. While ātman is
given many explicit definitions in the Upanishads, the nature of ātman is complex. In his
introduction to the Upanishads, Sanskritist Patrick Olivelle notes:

40. Jeffrey Brodd et al., Invitation to World Religions, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
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In [the Upanishads], the term most frequently used with reference to a living, breathing
body is ātman, a term liable to misunderstanding and mistranslating because it can also
mean the spiritual self or the inmost core of a human being, besides functioning as a mere
reflexive pronoun.
43

Ātman as the spiritual self, breath, and a reflexive pronoun are some of the distinct characteristics
of ātman in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad. In an attempt to avoid misunderstanding or
mistranslating ātman, as Olivelle cautions, selected excerpts from the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad
will be examined in order to reveal something about each of the three characteristics of ātman.
The basic function of ātman as the reflexive pronoun “I”, can be seen in the following:
In the beginning this world was just a single body (ātman) shaped like a man. He looked
around and saw nothing but himself. The first thing he said was, "Here I am!" and from
that the name "I" came into being. Therefore, even today when you call someone, he first
says, "It's I," and then states whatever other name he may have.
44

As this passage demonstrates, there is clearly the unproblematic existence of ātman as “I” in
Hinduism. Here too, the text reveals that ātman has taken the shape of man since the beginning
of time. This passage also asserts that the first thing man said (“Here I am!”) recognizes the
innate existence of the self. It is through this fundamental belief in “I” or ātman according to this
Upanishad that humans originate.
Ātman as the spiritual self insinuates the complexity of ātman; it is not just “I” or “self”
in the ordinary sense, but rather it is something extraordinary. This can be seen in Chapter 4
Verse 8 of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad:
This innermost thing, this self (ātman)—it is dearer than a son, it is dearer than wealth, it
is dearer than everything else. If a man claims that something other than his self is dear to
him, and someone were to tell him that he will lose what he holds dear, that is liable to

43. Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upanisads: Annotated Text and Translation (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 22.
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happen. So a man should regard only his self as dear to him. When a man regards only
his self as dear to him, what he holds dear will never perish.
45

In this assertion that ātman is “dearer than everything else” it shows just how highly regarded
ātman is in this tradition; self is something to care for and appreciate. Considering that the
Upanishads were reserved for people of higher castes, this verse is remarkable considering the
fact that it instructs the reader that self is more valuable than any amount of wealth. From this
recognition of ātman as most precious, one can understand how the concept of ātman as
Brahman develops.
In the beginning this world was only brahman, and it knew only itself (ātman), thinking:
“I am brahman” As a result, it became the Whole. Among the gods, likewise, whosoever
realized this, only they became the Whole. It was the same also among the seers and
among humans. Upon seeing this very point, the seer Vamadeva proclaimed: “I was
Manu, and I was the sun.” This is true even now. If a man knows “I am brahman” in this
way, he becomes this whole world. Not even the gods are able to prevent it, for he
becomes their very self (atman).
46

The monistic quality of ātman as Brahman is evidenced here because it shows the unification of
God, ātman, and the world that occurs when one understands ātman as Brahman. Not only is the
self something of great importance, but as this text instructs, the self literally is God and
simultaneously the world. As the text states, the thinking “I am brahman” results in ātman and
Brahman becoming whole. The concern in the last sentence that the gods might be jealous is
dismissed because the result of this thinking (“I am brahman”) is the deification of the self
through the oneness of ātman and Brahman. By this understanding the gods would not be jealous
because self is ultimately the divine. The oneness of ātman as Brahman informs the idea that
ātman is eternal, which is a defining characteristic of ātman as described in the Bhagavad Gita.
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The Bhagavad Gita, literally “The Song of the Lord,” is an epic poem that focuses on
47

the quest of the mythical warrior, Arjuna. According to scholars, the Bhagavad Gita was
composed between the second century BCE and the second century CE, which dates it
48

anywhere from four to nine centuries after the earliest Upanishads. While ātman appears in the
Upanishads as demonstrated before, the Bhagavad Gita is renowned for popularizing ideas about
this essential concept. Prior to the Bhagavad Gita, the content of sacred texts was reserved only
for those of the higher castes, but through the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna opens bhakti or devotion
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to all. People of lower castes were no longer excluded because they did not have enough money
to offer or because of karmic impurity. Instead, Krishna asserts that the intention one offers in
devotion is more important than any amount of money or any relative karma. The Bhagavad Gita
takes the form of a conversation between the warrior Arjuna and the God Krishna, beginning
50

with Arjuna expressing his concern to Krishna about fighting in the battle:
I see
perverse omens;
and before me
I see no good
in killing
my people
in battle,
Lovely-Haired Krishna! (1.31)
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Arjuna states his fear of seeing his family and friends die in battle and it is precisely from this
fear that Krishna outlines distinct characteristics of ātman. Krishna’s argument is that if Arjuna
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only knew the distinction between body and self, he would not be afraid to fight because he
would know that the self will not perish. In this way, Krishna urges Arjuna to fight because he
has nothing to lose; death is not the end of the self. Krishna says:
These bodies
have an end;
but they are said
to belong to the eternal
embodied self —
that which is never lost
and cannot be measured.
So fight, Son of Bharata! (2.18)
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It is on the grounds of belief in an eternal self or ātman that Krishna urges Arjuna to fight.
Krishna concedes that the body has an end, but the self does not, and for that reason Arjuna
should not be fearful to fight or even to die. Krishna does not stop at simply stating there is a
self but proceeds to list its many qualities. In the following twenty-one verses, Krishna describes
the attributes of the self: “…this self does not kill, nor is killed” (2.19), it is “…unborn, eternal,
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continuing from the old, the self is not killed when the body is killed” (2.20), and “the self is not
54

to be pierced, nor burned, nor drenched, nor dried; it is eternal, all-pervading and fixed—
unmoving from the beginning” (2.24). Each of these qualities reinforce the understanding of the
55

true self or ātman as eternal. In this way, the Bhagavad Gita instructs people to be fearless
because of the eternal nature of the self. It also reaffirms the relationship between ātman as
Brahman, because in order for the self to be Brahman or ultimate reality it must be eternal by
definition. Through this teaching of self as eternal, it instructs the practitioner to take comfort in
the permanent nature of true self.

52. Laurie Patton, The Bhagavad Gita, (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 21.
53. Laurie Patton, The Bhagavad Gita, (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 21.
54. Laurie Patton, The Bhagavad Gita, (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 21.
55. Laurie Patton, The Bhagavad Gita, (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 24.

27
In contrast to ātman as eternal and permanent in Hinduism, Buddhism states that the first
mark of existence is just the opposite: impermanence. Since the nature of all things without
exception is impermanent, the notion of an eternal self as presented in the Bhagavad Gita is
refuted. In Hinduism the self is defined as single, permanent, and independent of causes and
conditions, whereas in Buddhism the self is precisely its opposite: as comprised by the five
aggregates, it is multiple, impermanent, and dependent on causes and conditions, and thus not
truly existent. The introduction of the three marks of existence among core Buddhist beliefs
deliberately and explicitly negates the Hindu notion of ātman by introducing anātman or nonself, its inversion. This revolution of ātman to anātman can be understood through recognizing
the preeminence of suffering in the Buddha’s teachings.
Due to its ineffable nature, anātman is often misunderstood to mean that the self is
nothing at all, or even that nothing exists at all, as is the case in nihilistic thought. Buddhism
argues that anātman is not a complete absence of self but rather that “self does not exist as it
appears.” The following section will look at the Buddha’s teaching on non-self in the suttas, the
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first of the three-fold classification of Buddhist texts, specifically the Anattalakkhana Sutta and
his teaching on the five aggregates in the Mahahatthipadopama Sutta and the Sattatthana Sutta.
Suttas are considered to be the spoken words of Siddhartha Gautama and comprise the
foundational teachings of Buddhism. The tradition and scholars have varying views on when
exactly these discourses were written: according to tradition they were collected shortly after the
death of the Buddha, but scholars assert that these teachings were passed down orally for
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anywhere between one to three centuries after the death of the Buddha before being committed
to the page, with many emerging centuries later.

57

Arguably the most influential sutta on the teaching of non-self is the Anattalakkhana
Sutta. The Nikāyas are the collection of the Buddha’s discourses. The Anattalakkhana Sutta
58

comes from the Samyutta Nikaya meaning the “grouped collection”, the third of the five Nikayas.
This sutta takes place in Varnasi, India where the Buddha addresses a group of five monks. To
proceed with a discussion about non-self in the Anattalakkhana Sutta, it is first necessary to
define what “self” is actually comprised of according to Buddhism. The five aggregates or
skandhas in Buddhism are what embodies “self.” The five aggregates are (1) forms, (2) feelings,
(3) perceptions, (4) [mental] fabrications, and (5) consciousnesses. The Buddha first begins by
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stating that each of the five aggregates are not self:
Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease.
It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, “Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus.” But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not
possible [to say] with regard to form, “Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.”
Feeling is not self...
Perception is not self...
[Mental] fabrications are not self...
Consciousness is not self. If consciousness were the self, this consciousness would not
lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my
consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.” But precisely because
consciousness is not self, consciousness lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to
say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness
not be thus.”
60
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The first aggregate, form, compromises all material objects comprised of the “four properties,”
which the Buddha defines in the Mahahatthipadopama Sutta as the elements of earth, water, fire,
and wind. The earth property is comprised of things both “internal and external that are hard,
61

solid and sustained,” such as, hair, nails, teeth, skin, bones, organs, etc. The water property is
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“whatever internal, belonging to oneself, is liquid, watery, [and] sustained,” such as, bile, blood,
sweat, tears, etc. The fire property is “whatever internal, belonging to oneself is fire, fiery, [and]
sustained: that by which [the body] is warmed, aged, [and] consumed with fever…” Finally, the
63

wind property is “whatever internal, belonging to oneself, is wind, windy [and] sustained: upgoing winds, down-going winds, winds in the stomach, winds in the intestines, winds that course
through the body, in-&-out breathing, or whatever else internal, within oneself is wind, windy, &
sustained,” such as the breath. All of these properties compromise the first aggregate, form,
64

understood here as all the things which comprise the body.
In the Sattatthana Sutta, the Buddha divides the second, third, fourth, and fifth aggregates
even further into the six senses: sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, and the mind. The addition of
the sixth sense, the mind, is distinctly Buddhist. Each of these further divisions of the aggregates
show just how explicit the Buddha is in recognizing what appears to be self. While all of these
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classifications may seem tedious, the thoroughness of each distinction is actually quite
informative for the practitioner. In the practice of locating “self” one might claim that they have
located self because of the appearance of the five aggregates, similar to Descartes’ logic of “I
think therefore, I am”. Descartes asserts that because the fourth aggregate of [mental]
fabrications appears, the self must exist, however, this is fundamentally flawed because as the
Buddha states in the Anattalakkhana Sutta, “[Mental] fabrications are not self...” According to
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the Buddha’s teachings, in each of these distinctions one should see them with right discernment
that 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.’ Therefore, it is through each of
the aggregates that the practitioner will understand non-self.
After identifying each of the aggregates as not self in the Anattalakkhana Sutta, he
engages with the monks in a period of questions and answers. He first asks if each of the
aggregates are constant or inconstant, to which all reply “inconstant”, indicating impermanence
as the first mark of existence. He then proceeds to ask if “that which is inconstant easeful or
stressful?” to which they all reply “stressful, lord” indicating suffering as the second mark of
existence. Here one can see how the first two marks of existence, impermanence and suffering,
play a role in understanding the third mark, non-self. As the Buddha demonstrates in his
teachings, knowing that the five aggregates are inconstant (or impermanent), and that this
impermanence leads to stress (or suffering) will then lead one to see with “right discernment as:
'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am’", or the third mark of existence: nonself. As a result of understanding this “right discernment”, the sutta states that the monks become
disenchanted with each of the five aggregates. Following this disenchantment is dispassion and:
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Through dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, “Fully
released.” He discerns that “Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is
nothing further for this world.”
66

This passage shows just how essential the teaching of non-self is to enlightenment. The sutta
concludes with the enlightenment of the five monks through their realization of non-self. The
conclusion of the monks achieving enlightenment because of their own realization through the
Buddha’s teaching shows the value of experience within the tradition. This teaching of non-self
is critical to the Buddhist path and the cessation of suffering. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, a monk and
the translator of this particular text, emphasizes the need for the realization of suffering in
relation to non-self when he writes:
In this sense, the anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a not-self strategy for
shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness.
At that point, questions of self, no-self, and not-self fall aside. Once there’s the
experience of such total freedom, where would there be any concern about what’s
experiencing it, or whether or not it's a self?
67

As understood by Thanissaro Bhikkhu and the Anattalakkhana Sutta, the teaching on non-self is
a strategy by which one lets go of suffering and strives for nirvana, the third of the four noble
truths. The use of the term “strategy” here signifies the highly experiential nature of non-self.
Both the suttas discussed as well as the metaphor of the house, all demonstrate the Buddha’s role
as a teacher and how he uses discourse to overcome the ineffable nature of experience.
Contemporary scholar of Tibetan Buddhism Reginald Ray writes:
… If we examine our experience, we discover five different kinds of experiential events
(dharmas), but no solid, stable “I” or “self.” The five [aggregates] show us that we can
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view and explain the totality of our experience without any need for the additional
category of a “self.”
68

According to Ray, it is through experience that one will see each of the aggregates that appear to
comprise “self”. As these suttas have asserted, attachment to a sense of “self” contradicts the
first two marks of existence and therefore, it should be realized that self does not exist as it
appears.
The importance of experience through meditation is critical according to the three
primary trainings of Buddhism, wisdom, conduct, and meditation. Just as Ajahn Chah said that
“To understand not-self, you have to meditate,” the teachings from sutta discourse are expected
69

to be complemented by meditation practice. As Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche states
in Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, “Meditation without listening and reflecting is
blind, but listening [studying sutta] and reflecting without meditation is like having eyesight and
no legs.” In this way, it is through the unification of the three trainings that absolute truth can be
70

realized. In his instructions, Rimpoche states that relative truth is comprised of the Buddha’s
teachings “because it gives a proper understanding of what is to be abandoned and what is to be
cultivated.” As seen in the Anattalakkhana Sutta, one should abandon the thought that the five
71

aggregates are “self” and cultivate the understanding that “This is not mine. This is not my self.
This is not what I am.” This rich understanding of the relationship between meditation and
discourse in many ways aims to combat the challenges posed by ineffability. Had the Buddha

68. Reginald A. Ray, Indestructible Truth: The Living Spirituality of Tibetan Buddhism,
2002 (Boston, Mass.: Shambhala), 373.
69. Achaan Chah, A Still Forest Pool: The Insight Meditation of Achaan Chah, ed. Jack
Kornfield and Paul Breiter, (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1985), 173.
70. Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche, Progressive Stages of Meditation on
Emptiness, trans. Shenpen Hookham (Oxford: Longchen Foundation, 1988), 13.
71. Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche, Progressive Stages of Meditation on
Emptiness, trans. Shenpen Hookham (Oxford: Longchen Foundation, 1988),
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been defeated by the failure of language to describe experience, a whole religion might have
been lost. Instead through his use of metaphor, he encouraged his followers to see reality through
their own experience, or in other words, to experience the ineffability of enlightenment.

Conclusion
“I can’t even explain it!” “Words just don’t do it justice!” “You’ll just have to experience
it yourself!” These statements demonstrate the struggle of explaining religious experience due to
the ineffable nature of experience. Arguably one of the greatest challenges posed to religions is
ineffability, yet it is often the ineffability of religious experience that has captivated scholars
across time and disciplines. In the academic study of religion, discourse provides a way to study
concepts in the context of the traditions from which they arise. I found that taking a critical
approach to non-self in Buddhism helped me to better understand my own experience.
A year ago, I had a rather transformative experience in my meditation class and if I had
let the inability of words to perfectly articulate experience stop me from speaking about my
experience at all, I would probably not be concluding my undergraduate career with a paper
about non-self in Buddhism. After my experience last spring I did not want to meditate again, but
my academic pursuit of religion kept me engaged with the practice and with the nature of my
experience. Through further exploration of Buddhist discourse about non-self, I was able to
better understand parts of my own experience. Part of what scared me about my experience was
that I might not exist like I thought I did. I have lived my whole life creating an identity of
“Christina” and as a result of my experience, my own beliefs about who I was were challenged.
Through this process, I no longer fear the concept of non-self because through Buddhist
discourse I have seen that I do indeed appear through the five aggregates and for me that is good
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enough to proceed with living my life as I understand it. I do not feel the need to reject my whole
sense of self, as I might have thought was initially required from the nature of my experience,
but rather I can use what I understand about non-self in a productive way. Non-self has helped
me to look closer at the nature of my own experiences and react in more skillful ways. These
reasons have lead me to argue in favor of an experiential component of religion. At the end of
the day, texts such as the Bhagavad Gita or Sutta, remain literary documents until they are given
meaning by the reader. I think that the study of religion interests people precisely because there
is more than what appears, something that words cannot capture, and direct experience is a way
to transcend those limitations. In conclusion, I do not think that religion must be separate from
experience in order to be studied or that experience should be separated from religion but rather
they are insightful when brought into conversation with one another.
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